University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1990

The Two Faces of Tax Neutrality: Do They Interact
or Are They Mutually Exclusive?
Douglas A. Kahn
University of Michigan Law School, dougkahn@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/319

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kahn, Douglas A. "The Two Faces of Tax Neutrality: Do They Interact or Are They Mutually Exclusive?" N. Ky. L. Rev. 18 (1990):
1-19.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

SIEBENTHALER LECTURE
THE TWO FACES OF TAX NEUTRALITY: DO THEY
INTERACT OR ARE THEY MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE?
Douglas A. Kahn
The term "tax neutrality" refers to at least two quite different
concepts. In its most common usage, tax neutrality refers to tax
provisions that conform to an ideal tax system. A tax provision
that is consistent with such an ideal system is described as
"neutral." A tax provision that cannot be reconciled with the
ideal system is sometimes referred to as a "tax expenditure"
item. I will discuss tax expenditures later in this paper.
As one might expect, various persons' visions of an ideal tax
system will differ. However, those that' refer to tax neutrality in
this sense do share a fairly similar concept of what constitutes
an ideal tax system.
Virtually all versions of an ideal tax are grounded on the socalled "Haig-Simons definition of income." That definition is described and explained most thoroughly in a book (Personal Income
Taxation) authored by an economist, Henry Simons, a little over
50 years ago.1 Simons defined "personal income" as the increase
in a taxpayer's wealth over a specified period of time (typically
a period of a year) plus the market value of the taxpayer's
consumption during that period. In his own words, Simons said
that income was
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2)the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question.
In other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the period to 'wealth' at the end of the period
and then subtracting 'wealth' at the beginning.'

1. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938). See also Haig, The Concept of Income,
Economic and Legal Aspects in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921), reprinted
in American Economic Ass'n, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (R. Musgrave
& C. Shoup eds. 1959).
2. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 50.
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By way of illustration, Simons adopts the analogy of treating
society as a giant partnership and an individual's income as the
sum of his withdrawals (consumption) from the partnership and
the change in value of his equity or interest in the partnership.
It is possible to view the Haig-Simons formula as an equation
rather than as a definition of income. Income can thus be viewed
merely as a surrogate for the accumulation of wealth and the
consumption of goods and services, that is, the income tax is
determined by a taxpayer's consumption of goods and services
and on his accumulation of wealth. As we shall see, even the tax
on the accumulation of wealth element is a tax on consumption.
How does the Haig-Simons definition relate to the income tax
system currently in place? An expenditure that does not involve
the consumption of goods or services results in a reduction of
the taxpayer's wealth and so should reduce the taxpayer's tax
base. Accordingly, expenditures that do not involve consumption
should be allowable as deductions from a taxpayer's gross income.
On the other hand, if an expenditure does involve a consumption,
it should be taxed to the taxpayer; and so no deduction should
be allowed against the taxpayer's gross income. The reduction
of the taxpayer's wealth is balanced by the market value of the
taxpayer's consumption. Income tax deductions, therefore, can be
viewed as the system for taxing consumptions and for not taxing
non-consumption expenditures.
Consumption denotes the value of rights exercised in the
destruction of economic goods, which include services.3 It refers
to a taxpayer's exhaustion of a portion of society's assets. To the
extent that a person uses up society's goods, it is fair to allocate
the burdens of the cost of running the government to that person.
By denying a deduction for the cost of a consumption, the effect
is to tax the consumption itself.
One thesis of this paper is that the Haig-Simons definition of
income has been used for purposes which it cannot properly
serve. The definition is a useful tool, but it does more harm than
good when its evaluative attributes are exaggerated. In seeking
to restrict the usefulness of Haig-Simons, I do not wish to
minimize the true value that it has as an analytic tool by imposing
a structure on the income tax system so that the role that broad

3.

SIMONS,

supra note 1, at 49-50.
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tax principles play in the system becomes comprehensible. In
some of the illustrations that I discuss later in this paper, I will
attempt to indicate the ways in which the definition is useful as
well as some areas in which it provides no analytic assistance.
At this point, I will digress briefly to demonstrate how the HaigSimons approach can help explain why the taxation of earnings
from savings is characterized by some commentators as double
taxation, 4 which therefore promotes consumption.
Under the Haig-Simons definition of income, the income tax
can be seen to be more closely related to a consumption tax than
would appear on its face. In essence, it is a tax on present
consumption and on the present value of a taxpayer's future
consumption. So, if I earn a dollar in Year One and use that
dollar to purchase a dollar's worth of entertainment, I will be
taxed on the dollar of income; but the income can be seen as
merely representing the one dollar of consumption that I had. If
I do not spend the dollar and, instead, save it, I am taxed on the
present value of the consumption that I can enjoy at some future
date when I (or someone else) spend the dollar for a consumption
item.
When the dollar is spent at a future date, it will not incur a
tax then because it was taxed in the prior year in which it was
earned. However, the present value in Year One of a dollar that
is to be spent in some future year (for example, Year Four) is
less than one dollar. That is, the value in Year One of a person's
consumption of a dollar's value in that year is greater than the
value in Year One of a person's consumption of a dollar's value
in Year Four. The value in Year One will be the amount consumed
in Year Four discounted to present value, that is, the present
value of a dollar to be used in a future year is the amount in
the current year that is needed to produce the amount expended
in the future year if invested at a specified rate of interest,
typically compounded interest. The amount of discount depends
upon the interest rate that is employed and the frequency of
compounding, if a compounded rate is used.
Given the need to discount, one might question whether it is
fair to tax a dollar saved at its current value when it will not

4. See Kahn, Should General Utilities Be Reinstated to Provide Partial Integration of
Corporate and Personal Income - Is Half A Loaf Better Than None?, 13 J. CORP. LAW
953, 961 (1988).
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be used for consumption until some future date. It is fair to do
so since the dollar earned in Year One can be invested to produce
income, and in Year Four, the taxpayer can expend on consumption not only the original dollar saved but also the income earned
thereon between Years One and Four. For example, if the taxpayer expends in Year Four the saved dollar plus the amount
earned thereon, the Year One discounted value of the amount
expended will equal one dollar if the rate of income earned is
equal to the discount rate.
One difficulty with the above analysis is that the income earned
on the saved dollar will be subjected to taxation when earned.
Since the justification for taxing in Year One the dollar saved in
that year is that the present value of the amount that ultimately
will be expended on consumption, the tax on that dollar incorporates a tax on the discounted value of one dollar spent in a
future year plus a tax on the income earned on the investment
of that dollar. Therefore, to tax separately each year's income
from the investment of the dollar amounts to double taxation.
Returning to the question of tax neutrality, Simons contended
that it is important to apply neutral standards in determining
whether to adopt or retain tax provisions in order that the tax
levies be fairly allocated. This concept of a fair allocation is often
identified as "horizontal and vertical equity." Horizontal equity
requires that any two persons having similar income positions
should have a similar amount df tax liability. Vertical equity
means that persons having disparate income positions should
have comparably disparate tax liabilities. Apart from a desire
for a just tax system in an absolute sense, the public's willingness
to accept a tax system will be severely damaged if the public's
perception of the system is that it is unfair, that is, that some
persons are not bearing their fair share of the tax burden.5
The late Professor Stanley Surrey embellished the tax neutrality concept and characterized tax provisions that violate the

5. Neither Simons nor his intellectual progeny discuss whether the more important
consideration is the public's perception of fairness or actual fairness. The two do not
necessarily go together. A completely proper and fair deduction that is permitted to one
small group may be perceived by many others to be improper. Unless the justification
for the deduction can be explained to the larger group's satisfaction, the deduction may
have to be repealed, even if that causes the small group to be taxed on a disproportionately
high income base. The perception of fairness by a substantial portion of taxpayers may
be more important than the reality.
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concept of neutrality and that benefit some taxpayers as "tax
expenditures," that is, a failure to tax someone according to
neutral principles was characterized by Surrey as a governmental
expenditure which is essentially identical to a direct outlay of
governmental funds.6 While Professor Surrey did not originate
the "tax expenditure" concept, he is primarily responsible for its
acceptance and popularity. The concept has been widely adopted;
for example, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law
93-344) requires that a report on tax expenditures be submitted
to the House and Senate Budget Committees and that a list of
tax expenditures be included in the Budget of the United States
Government.
According to the tax expenditure concept, a preferential treatment provided by the income tax laws to a group of taxpayers
is identical to the Government's making a direct payment to that
group. Preferential tax treatments, therefore, are listed as Governmental expenditures. Preferential treatments include: the allowance of an unwarranted deduction, the failure to include a
revenue item in gross income, the granting of a credit, a differential tax rate, or some other tax benefit.
As initially conceived, the principal standard that was employed to identify tax expenditures was the Haig-Simons definition of income, that is, a tax provision that fails to conform to
the Haig-Simons ideal tax structure and that benefits a group of
taxpayers is deemed to violate the principle of tax neutrality and
so constitutes a tax expenditure in the amount of income tax
that was not collected because of the preferential tax treatment.
However, a Haig-Simons comparison is not the only standard
against which a tax provision is measured. If Congress adopts a
general principle as part of its tax system and if, for some policy
purpose, Congress does not apply that principle uniformly, any
departure from the normal principle that benefits certain taxpayers is treated as a tax expenditure. It is not always obvious,
however, which tax provision is to be classified as the normal
principle and which provision is the exception. In practice, it
would seem that the notion of tax neutrality, as measured by an

6. See, e.g., Surrey, Tax Incentives As A Device For Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); SURREY,
PATHWAYS To TAX REFORM (1973); SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, (1985).
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ideal tax structure, .will influence the determination of which tax
provisions are the normal ones.
The Tax Expenditure Budgets that are prepared by the Staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation and by the Congressional
Budget Office rely on both Haig-Simons neutrality principles and
on departures from normal Congressional policies to compile their
lists of tax expenditures.7 Since 1983, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, in formulating its tax expenditure budget, has
purported to rely exclusively on departures from normal Congressional policies." It appears, however, that the tax neutrality
concept, as determined by reference to an ideal tax system, has
greatly influenced the determination of which provisions depart
from normal Congressional policies.
Since the Haig-Simons definition plays such an important part
in the formulation of the several tax expenditure budgets, it is
worth examining how useful that definition is in determining the
appropriateness of a given tax provision. By the way, it is
noteworthy that tax expenditure budgets list only expenditures;
they make no mention of tax receipts from the taxation of items
that would be excluded if a neutral view of income, as determined
by Haig-Simons concepts or by reference to "normal" tax policies,
were adopted.
Simons himself admitted that "it is not possible, in practice,
to define, establish or adhere closely to an ideal tax base." 9 There
often are reasons to repudiate or disregard the direction established by an objective definition of income, and "such concessions
are often the part of wisdom and sound policy."10 Also, the proper
tax treatment of some items cannot be determined merely by
referring to income definitions, that is, the deductibility of expenses that have a business purpose but also provide a personal
benefit to the taxpayer. Simons claimed no more than that his
definition provides a tool of analysis which, though crude, is
useful. To see the limitations of that tool, let us consider the
application of the definition to a few selected tax items.

7. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 1990-1994 (JCS-4-89), February 28, 1989, pp. 3-4.
8. Office of Management and Budget, "Tax Expenditures," Special Analysis G, The
Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1990, pp. A-59 to A-61.
9. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 30.
10. Id. at 30-31.

1990]

SIEBENTHALER LECTURE

Under the tax law, a donee does not have income from receiving
a gift as that term is defined by case law.11 Simons states that
there is no justification for excluding gifts from a donee's income
since it increases his wealth. Simons does recognize that in
certain circumstances it would be administratively difficult to
apply an income tax to gifts and in certain other circumstances
it would be harsh to tax a gift fully to the donee; but, in general,
he believed that gifts should be taxed. 12 One example of a gift
that it would be difficult to tax is the partaking of a meal at a
friend's home. Similarly, it would be difficult to administer a tax
on the loan of a car to a friend or a family member for an errand.
Another problem would arise in connection with support provided
to family members. If the support is a legal obligation of the
transferor, would it be proper to treat it as a gift? Even if the
transferor is not legally obligated for support (for example, where
a parent or grandparent pays the expenses of a college education
of a child who is over the age of 18 years and where there is no
legal obligation to pay those expenses), it does not appear to be
good tax policy to tax the child. In any event, there are reasons
for excluding gifts from income even where the gift does not
create some special problem such as those noted above.
The funds donated by a donor were previously taxed to the
donor when he earned them. Drawing upon the Haig-Simons
approach, the taxation of the donor's prior retention of his earnings can be viewed as a tax on the consumption that will be
obtained from those funds at some future date. Putting it differently, when a taxpayer is taxed on a dollar of income, he is
entitled to a dollar of consumption (without allowing for depletion
due to the payment of a tax liability thereon). In what respect
do the funds transferred by a donor represent a consumption of
goods or services? If it is not a consumption, then the taxation
of the donor for a dollar earned by him and the taxation of that
dollar as income to the donee when the dollar is transferred to
the donee constitutes double taxation. The gift transaction should
be contrasted to a taxpayer's purchase of another's services in
which event the payment to the employee represents a consumption by the payer; the taxation of the payee on the receipt of
the payment does not constitute double taxation since the payer
11. I.R.C. S 102 (1986).
12. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 125-147.

8

NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:1

has obtained his consumption for the dollar that was previously
taxed to him.
Simons apparently would treat the gift of funds to a donee as
a consumption by the donor, and so he did not deem a tax on
the donee to constitute double taxation. The transfer of funds
from a donor to a donee does not, however, exhaust any of
society's goods; the exhaustion of a good would seem to be a sine
qua non for a consumption. An alternative approach, suggested
by Professor Wayne Barnett in several unpublished papers, is to
treat the transfer to the donee as a commitment by the donor
to have the donee expend the funds on the donor's behalf. Thus,
the donor is permitted either to use the taxed funds for his own
consumption or to obtain a vicarious consumption by having
another use the funds. My point is that the choice between these
two alternative approaches (Simons' approach which taxes the
gift and Barnett's approach which excludes it) is not aided by
referring to the Haig-Simons definition. But, Haig-Simons is helpful in focusing the resolution of this issue on questions concerning
consumption.
The determination as to the propriety of excluding gifts from
income will turn ultimately on one's view as to what taxpayers
should be allowed to do with their taxed income. If one believes
that it is proper to permit a taxpayer to have someone else use
the taxed funds for consumption, then gifts should be excluded.
If gifts are not excluded, the donor's capacity to transfer his
taxed income to others for their consumption will be impaired
since the taxation of the gift as income to the donee will reduce
the amount available to the donee. This issue turns on attitudes
and values in which Haig-Simons plays no part.
To take another example (and one to which Simons himself
refers), consider the deductibility of expenses that assist in the
production of income and also satisfy personal needs or benefits.
Child care expenses and commuting expenses are two illustrations of this type of expenditure. I will discuss child care expenses
later in this paper. Another example is the question of how the
tax law should treat expenses incurred in obtaining a professional
or trade education. An education can qualify the taxpayer to
earn income in a profession or trade, and so the expenses incurred
in obtaining that education can be viewed as a business expense
or as a capital expenditure that can be depreciated over a period
no longer than the taxpayer's life expectancy. On the other hand,
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an education also has personal, noneconomic benefits to a taxpayer, that is, it benefits the taxpayer in ways that have no
bearing on the production of income. Should a deduction or
amortization be permitted for such expenditures or should the
personal aspect of the education control so that no deduction will
be allowed? The current tax law denies any deduction or amortization for educational expenses incurred in qualifying to enter
a new trade or profession. 13 The rationale for that treatment is
that the personal aspect of the education is so inextricably
entwined with the business aspect that it is not possible to
allocate the expense between them. 14 On the other hand, once
the taxpayer has entered a trade or profession, his expenses in
obtaining an education that maintains or improves his skills are
deductible." Yet, the education of a person already engaged in
his trade or profession provides no less personal benefit than
does an education obtained prior to entering the trade or profession. Haig-Simons provides no insight that would help determine
whether the current law's treatment is proper or whether some
other approach would be preferable.
One possible rationale for the current treatment of educational
expenses is that it is analogous to the replacement depreciation
method (sometimes referred to as the "retirement-replacementbetterment accounting method"). Replacement depreciation is a
method under which the initial investment in certain assets is
capitalized and neither deducted nor amortized. As each item is
replaced, a deduction is taken for the cost of the replacement.' 6
Restaurants may use that method for the treatment of their
chinaware. Similarly, the expenditure for obtaining the education
needed to enter a trade or profession is capitalized, and the
expenditures incurred after entering the trade or profession,
even some that are capital in nature, are currently deducted.
Horizontal and vertical equity concepts, which underlie tax
neutrality, are not helpful in determining whether the comparison

13. Treas. Reg. S 1.162-5(b) (as amended in 1967). See Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d
1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
14. See Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
941 (1979).
15. Treas. Reg. S1.162-5(a), (c) (as amended in 1967).
16. See Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. United States, 603 F.2d 165 (Ct. Cls. 1979). See also
BITTKER & TOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 5 23.6.5 (2d ed.
1989).
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of income should be made on an individual basis or on the basis
of a family unit or whether it should be made on an individual
basis for some purposes and on a family unit basis for other
purposes. They also are not helpful in defining a family unit. One
reason that Haig-Simons does not help resolve the question of
the proper treatment of gifts is because it does not address the
question of the extent to which several persons should be treated
as a single taxable unit for some purposes. Of course, gifts are
only one example of tax problems that raise questions involving
the choice of a taxable unit.
The current treatment of gifts by the tax law has made the
measurement of a taxable unit turn, for certain limited purposes,
on the donor's intent in making the transfer. If the transfer
proceeds from detached and disinterested generosity of the donor,
then the donor and the donee are treated as a single taxable
unit for the purpose of permitting the unit one consumption.
Also, the donee's gain on the sale or exchange of donated property is determined by using the basis that the donor had in that
property with certain adjustments. 17 Thus, for the limited purpose
of measuring the donee's gain, the donor and the donee are
treated as a single taxable unit.
As I already mentioned, a workable income tax system cannot
comply fully with Haig-Simons or with any other version of an
ideal income measurement. Practical, administrative considerations will prevent the adoption of such systems. The doctrine of
realization and the availability of reporting on the cash receipts
and disbursements method do violence to the Haig-Simons definition; and yet (with only a few exceptions such as the treatment
of original issue discount) the tax law requires realization and
permits cash method reporting. Simons himself concedes that the
requirement of realization is a practical necessity. 8
Another major distortion to Haig-Simons occurs because the
tax laws do not tax imputed income, especially imputed income
from the use of consumer properties such as a residence, a yacht,
an art collection, and similar items. For example, if a taxpayer
purchases valuable paintings, he not only escapes taxation on the
unrealized appreciation of a painting over the years that he holds

17. I.R.C. 5 1015 (1986).
18. SIMONS,

supra note 1, at 153.
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it, he also escapes taxation on the income he obtains from the
paintings by having them available on his wall for his viewing.
Once the inclusion of these treatments in the tax system are
accepted as necessary (or at least as highly desirable) for policy
reasons, then the tax system has so departed from the HaigSimons ideal that other provisions that fail to conform to HaigSimons cannot be attacked on neutrality grounds. Indeed, since
the tax system does not adhere to Haig-Simons in many substantial respects, the conformance of a single provision to the HaigSimons model may cause greater inequity than would another
approach that disregards Haig-Simons. Before considering some
illustrations, we should turn to the second meaning or "face" of
tax neutrality to see how that concept relates to the Haig-Simons
standard.
Tax neutrality is sometimes used to describe a tax system that
does not create a bias that could influence a taxpayer to choose
one investment or course of action over another. For example, if
the tax on the income from rental realty is less than the tax on
the same amount of income from bonds, the tax law will distort
the market choice between investing in realty or in bonds. As
used in this context, a tax neutral provision is one that permits
the choice of investment or action to be made on the basis of
market or personal considerations without influence from the tax
laws. The question arises whether there is a conflict between
seeking this type of neutrality and the Haig-Simons neutrality of
a tax system that conforms to an ideal definition of income.
First, note that the imposition of a tax system will influence
some market decisions no matter how the system is designed.
The system can be designed to be neutral as to certain choices,
but there will always be others over which the tax laws exert
an influence. Take this example. Fred is engaged in a selfemployed business, and his income is taxed at a 50 percent rate
(an unrealistic figure under current tax schedules but one that
simplifies computations). In effect, the government has become a
partner with Fred so that it takes 50 percent of his income and
bears 50 percent of his business expenses. In considering whether
to incur a business expense, such as an advertising expense, Fred
will take into account that he will bear only 50 percent of the
cost. His silent partner will bear the other 50 percent. This type
of consideration becomes especially weighty if the business expense is one that contains an element of personal benefit to Fred.

12
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Travel and entertainment expenses are examples of such expenses, especially when the trip is to an attractive location. It is
true that only 80 percent of the cost of Fred's meals can be
deducted, 9 but that limitation only reduces the government's
share of Fred's costs. The government nevertheless will bear a
portion of the expense of Fred's meals while on travel status,
and that will influence Fred's decision whether to undertake the
business trip.
As I previously noted, a number of doctrines that contravene
Haig-Simons are embraced in the tax system because they are
necessary to its orderly administration. The operation of these
doctrines often creates a tax bias that skews personal and financial choices. The question can then arise as to whether tax
adjustments should be adopted to eliminate that bias. Let us
consider several illustrations.
H and W have been engaged in separate businesses for several
years before they had a child. W took time off from work to
have their child and to care for the infant for the first two
months of his life. W now has to decide whether to terminate
her job and to stay home and care for her child or to pay for
child care and return to her work.
First, let us consider whether the cost of child care should be
a deductible expense. The child care expense bears elements of
a personal consumption (an expense of having and caring for a
child) but also bears elements of a business expense of producing
income. W might contend that the child care expense is a necessary expense of freeing her to earn income since she could not
work if the child's needs were not met. On the other hand, before
the child was born, W was able to earn the same income without
incurring child care expenses. The expense can be viewed as a
cost of having and caring for a child, which is a personal expenditure. Indeed, even after birth, W does not have to care for the
child; she could place the child up for adoption. The child care
cost is incurred primarily because W chose to have and to retain
the child. Let us assume for purposes of this illustration that my
analysis is correct. The expense of having the child cared for is
a personal expenditure that cannot be deducted under normal
definitions of a business expense and would not be deductible

19. I.R.C. S 274 (n) (1986).
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under the Haig-Simons approach. Even so, that does not definitively resolve the question of whether the expense should be
deductible.
H and W file a joint tax return, and their marginal tax bracket
is 50 percent (again, an unrealistic figure). The annual cost of
providing child care for the infant will be $5,000. If W stays
home and takes care of the child herself, she will provide services
valued at $5,000 to the family. Because the tax laws do not tax
imputed income, the family will retain $5,000 of income after
taxes from W's services.
Instead, W can return to work, earn income of $8,000 before
taxes are deducted, and pay $5,000 to provide child care for her
infant. Since W's $8,000 will be taxed at a 50 percent rate, she
will retain only $4,000 after taxes as compared to the $5,000 that
she would retain from providing child care services herself. The
failure to tax W's imputed services creates a tax bias in favor
of staying home and not retaining her job. In these facts, the
tax bias is especially strong since W will net $1,000 less, after
taxes, than she must pay for the child care expenses. So, it will
cost W $1,000 a year in cash outlay to continue her job instead
of staying home. W may nevertheless decide to continue her
employment, but the tax bias will make that a more difficult
decision.
Even if W could earn $15,000 annually from her job so that
she would show a net profit of $2,500 after paying her taxes and
child care costs, there would still be a tax bias against her
returning to work. The failure to tax the imputed income that
W would produce by staying home reduces the financial benefits
that W would otherwise have obtained by choosing work over
staying home.
Congress could eliminate the tax bias described above. One
method of elimination would be to tax W on imputed income
from caring for her child, but that course is subject to administrative and practical objections. An alternative approach is to
grant W a deduction for the expenses she incurs for child care.
If that cost is deductible, there is no tax benefit to either choice
that W might make; the choice can be made on the basis of
personal and financial consideration unhindered by tax influence. 0

20. Current tax law provides a credit for a portion of child care expenses rather than
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Note, however, that granting W a deduction for child care
expenses will increase another tax bias that exists. The decision
whether to have a child will take many factors into account
including the cost of caring for the child. Since a parent can
provide the service of child care and since the resulting income
to the family from receiving the benefit of that service is not
taxed, the cost of child care is lower than it would be if the
imputed income were taxed. That will influence the decision
whether to have a baby. If child care expenses are nondeductible,
the tax bias will operate only when one of the spouses intends
to stay home and care for the baby. If child care expenses are
made deductible, that will expand the circumstances in which
there is a tax bias favoring a decision to have a child.
From this scenario, we can see that the existence of a tax bias
is not a sufficient justification for granting a tax benefit that
removes the bias. The removal of one tax bias will almost certainly create a new bias or expand an existing one as to some
other choice. In determining whether to grant a deduction for
child care expenses, Congress should determine whether there
are social, economic or political reasons to prevent the tax laws
from influencing the choice on which the existing bias operates,
and Congress should determine whether the resulting creation
of a new bias is of less importance than the removal of the bias
in question.
Congress also should consider whether there is available some
other arrangement that would resolve the problem and whether
that other arrangement is preferable. For example, the child care
problem might be addressed by having the federal government
provide (or encourage others to provide) free child care facilities.
That choice raises the question as to the importance of decentralizing the decision for the selection of the type of child care
to be employed. Note, however, that the provision of free child
care services raises another tax issue, namely, should the recip-

to allow a deduction. Section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Note that a limited
amount of the value of dependent care assistance that an employer provides for an
employee may be excluded from the employee's gross income by S 129 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986. The credit allowed for child and dependent care expenses and the
exclusion of employer provided dependent care assistance are both included as tax
expenditure items in the several Tax Expenditure Budgets made available to Congress.
See, e.g., Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 1990-1994 (JCS-4-89) February 25, 1989, p. 16.
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ient of such services be taxed on their value? The decision to
grant a tax credit for a limited amount of child care expenses
poses a similar problem. The granting of a tax credit is akin to
disbursing funds to the parents, and the question then arises
whether the amount of credit obtained by a person should be
included in that person's gross income and subjected to income
taxation.
The Haig-Simons principles are of no help whatsoever in deciding whether to adopt an adjustment that neutralizes one tax
bias and opens another. The bias against W's working was created
by a necessary departure from the Haig-Simons model (the failure
to tax imputed income); there is no reason why there should be
a presumption against correcting that bias because the correcting
provision would also contravene Haig-Simons principles. Just
because the decision to neutralize a tax bias by granting a
deduction will rest on economic and social policy considerations,
that does not turn the tax benefit obtained from such a deduction
into a governmental subsidy.
The "principle" of neutralizing tax influences on choices is not
a true principle. Tax influences cannot be eliminated, and therefore they are a necessary cost of having an income tax system.
The so-called principle of neutrality is merely a recognition that
the cost of such a tax influence is sometimes too great because
considerations of economic or social policy dictate that some
specific choice should be made on market or personal grounds.
The neutralizing of the tax influence on such a choice often will
require adopting a provision that does not conform to the HaigSimons definition of income. In that respect, this type of neutrality can be said to conflict with Haig-Simons neutrality.
Haig-Simons is useful to explain the skeletal framework of an
income tax system as pictured in a kind of blueprint. It provides
a conceptual structure. Once construction began on the system,
however, it became clear that the blueprint was inadequate in
many important respects. The final product bears only a slight
resemblance to the original plan. The departure from that plan
is so extensive that there is no sense in attempting to conform
current additions to and modifications of the structure to the
original or "ideal" concept.
That is not to say that there are no overarching concepts to
the income tax system. Rather, it is to say that the income tax
system is much more complex than the structure delineated by
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the relatively simple formula that Simons pronounced. The popularity of Haig-Simons may be attributable partly to its simplicity
but primarily, as shown below, it is because it serves a useful
political purpose in underpinning the tax expenditure concept.
The beauty of the tax expenditure concept is that it purports to
embody a highly sophisticated view of the tax system when, in
fact, it rests on a rather simplistic premise.
Returning to the tax expenditure budget, it rests partly on
the notion that there is a normal or neutral tax system and that
a provision that departs from that ideal system lacks neutrality
and violates equity requirements. The proponents of this budget
do not claim that any departure from tax neutrality is wrong,
but they maintain that anyone seeking the enactment of such a
departure has the burden of proving that there are strong policy
considerations to justify the distortion of an ideal system, the
same type of policy considerations that should accompany a
decision to make a direct expenditure of Government funds. By
imposing a heavy burden of persuasion on those seeking to retain
or adopt provisions that benefit some taxpayers, the proponents
of the tax expenditure concept have gained a political advantage.
They have loaded the political dice in their favor since they tend
to disapprove of such provisions.
The profit-oriented activities of an individual typically are not
isolated from his personal needs and desires. People are not
purely income-making machines. It is common, therefore, to find
that an individual will have mixed profit and personal motives
for making an expenditure. One objection to the tax expenditure
budget concept is that it draws a kind of Maginot Line in which
the tax provisions that fall on one side of the line are classified
as expenditures and the provisions on the other side are considered to be proper. Rather than viewing tax provisions as falling
on one side of the line or the other (a sort of "one is either
pregnant or not pregnant approach"), it would be more useful to
view tax provisions as lying on a spectrum, their place on which
depends upon how closely associated the provision is to income
measurement. The further removed that a provision lies from
income measurement, the greater the policy justification for that
provision should be. However, the comparison of different provisions and the policy justifications for them cannot be reduced
to some precise or mathematical formula. The fact alone that the
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adoption of a tax provision rests on policy considerations should
not make that provision suspect. Virtually all tax provisions rest
on policy considerations since there are very few items that
relate exclusively to income measurement.
Take one last illustration. Jeff pays $100,000 cash to purchase
a residence. Thereafter, he lives in the house which continually
appreciates in value. Jeff is not taxed on the income he obtains
by using the house, and he is not taxed on the house's appreciation so long as he continues to hold the property. While Jeff
gets no depreciation deduction for the use of the house (quite
properly since he recognizes no income therefrom), he is allowed
a deduction for the property taxes imposed on the property.
Jeff has a friend, Mary, who purchases a house for $100,000
at the same time that Jeff acquired his. Mary had $100,000 capital
available to put into the house, but she chose instead to borrow
$100,000 from a bank at 10 percent interest. Mary chose to borrow
the needed funds because she can invest her $100,000 of capital
in a partnership and earn a 15 percent return. So each year,
Mary will earn $15,000 on the partnership investment of her
$100,000 capital, and she will make an interest payment of $10,000
on the loan. However, the income that she earns on her partnership investment is taxable to her. Assuming a 50 percent marginal
rate, Mary would retain only $7,500 of the income from her
partnership investment after taxes. If the interest payment that
Mary must make were not deductible, Mary's earnings from her
partnership investment would yield $2,500 less than that interest
payment. Mary would probably be better off not to borrow the
money and to invest her $100,000 in the purchase of the house.
On the other hand, if the interest payment is deductible, Mary
can make the interest payment out of her partnership investment
income and still have $2,500 left over after taxes. To allow an
interest deduction encourages Mary to invest her funds more
efficiently in that she can produce a larger rate of return from
the partnership investment than she can obtain by using the
funds to purchase the house. By granting an interest deduction,
the tax law has neutralized the tax consequences of choosing
between investing in a residence and borrowing the funds so
that capital can be invested elsewhere. The deduction also neutralizes the tax treatment of home purchasers who do not have
the capital available to put into their homes and so must borrow
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the needed funds. The merits of providing that neutrality depend
upon policy considerations that have nought to do with so-called
normal definitions of income.
The failure to tax homeowners on the imputed rental value of
their homes creates a tax bias in favor of purchasing a home
rather than to rent one. That bias is expanded by permitting an
interest deduction for those who borrow the purchase price of
the home (or some part thereof). Congress perceives the bias for
home ownership to be an acceptable cost of obtaining its policy
objectives. Indeed, it is likely that the interest deduction was
granted in order to create a tax bias against renting and in favor
of home ownership. Congress may believe that home ownership
fosters social stability and promotes good citizenship. Note that
even without an interest deduction, the failure to tax imputed
income creates a tax bias against renting, but the adoption of
the interest deduction enhances that bias.
Should the interest deduction be classified as a tax expenditure
or government subsidy? 21 To the extent that the deduction neutralizes the tax treatment of those who have sufficient capital to
invest in a residence and of those who borrow the purchase price,
it can be seen as merely negating a market distortion that the
tax law introduced. But, to the extent that the deduction induces
persons to purchase homes rather than to rent, it can be viewed
as a subsidy to home ownership. How should the determination
be made as to whether the allowance of the deduction is a subsidy
or merely a neutralizer? Should it turn on the subjective purpose
of Congress, assuming one can determine some institutional purpose for that body, or should it be determined by the consequences of the provision regardless of the Congressional motive?
The difficulty of resolving that issue and the questionable utility
of any characterization that might be reached are part of the
reasons that a tax expenditure budget is so misleading.
There are numerous types of tax provisions which I have not
discussed in this paper. For example, I have not discussed the
appropriateness of the personal deductions, such as medical expenses, casualty and theft losses. Those deductions raise the
question of whether profit measurement should be the exclusive

21. The deduction for interest on a home mortgage is included in the list of tax
expenditure items by all three tax expenditure budgets.
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goal of a definition of "income" for tax purposes. Stating it
differently, are those items to be treated as consumptions for
income tax purposes? For example, if after earning $1,000 for his
services, A were to collect that amount in cash from the paymaster, and if immediately after receiving his pay in cash, A
were mugged and relieved of the $1,000, should A be treated as
having consumed the $1,000 for tax purposes so that A will be
taxed on that amount? As to charitable contributions, one question is whether the allowance of a deduction is a subsidy for
.charitable activities or whether it is a proper recognition that a
charitable contribution is not a consumption by the donor and is
not a deferred and vicarious consumption by the donor when the
charitable donee expends the donated funds. I will leave such
issues for a later paper or for others to explore. As to charitable
and medical expenses, there already exists an excellent article
by Professor William Andrews and a thoughtful reply by Professor Mark Kelman. 22 Haig-Simons is not very useful in determining
how to characterize such items.
The inclusion of such personal items in a tax expenditure
budget indicates that they are not proper tax allowances because
they do not come within the definition of income. That may be
so, but that determination rests on a complex analysis of the
goals and function of an income tax system, the need for which
analysis is obscured by placing the item on a list of non-qualifying
provisions. Perhaps the major fault of the tax expenditure budget
is that it permits a relatively few people to make these judgments
without revealing the basis of their determinations much less
exposing to the legislators the nature of their analysis and the
values on which their ultimate conclusion rests. It suggests an
application of a more mechanical and precise standard than exists.

22. Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972);
Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax
and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).

